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Marketing and the Tragedy of the Commons: A Synthesis, 
Commentary, and Analysis for Action 
Clifford J. Shultz II and Morris B. Holbrook 
The authors contend that solutions to the most pressing environmental challenges will result 
from understanding and solving social traps such as the commons dilemma. They propose a 
synthesis for analysis and action to suggest that marketing's stakeholders can cooperate to 
contribute solutions and ultimately develop programs that help ameliorate the tragedy of 
the commons. 
Environmentalism will be one of the greatest chal- 
lenges in the twenty-first century. The effect of mar- 
keting activities on environment preservation there- 
fore matters increasingly to many marketers, consumers, 
and marketing policy scholars (e.g., Ellen, Wiener, and 
Cobb-Walgren 1991; Granzin and Olsen 1991; Milne, Iyer, 
and Gooding-Williams 1996; Pickett, Kangun, and Grove 
1993; Pieters et al. 1998; Pilling, Crosby, and Ellen 1991; 
Schwepker and Cornwell 1991). Marketing enterprises have 
discovered that ecological issues often can provide a source 
of competitive advantage (e.g., Gifford 1997). Thus, busi- 
nesses now focus on the problem of sustainable growth or 
development (e.g., Elkington 1994; Hart 1997; Ruckelshaus 
1989), whereas marketers aspire to ecological (e.g., Fisk 
1974), environmental (e.g., Polonsky and Mintu-Wimsatt 
1995), green (e.g., Ottman 1993; Wasik 1996), or, more 
recently, enviropreneurial (e.g., Hartman and Stafford 1998; 
Menon and Menon 1997; Varadarajan 1992) marketing. 
But, when we consider the plethora of strategies, products, 
and advertising campaigns that purport to be "green," we 
cannot help but wonder how many of these truly work 
toward environmental protection (cf. Beder 1997; Gray-Lee, 
Scammon, and Mayer 1994; Kangun, Carlson, and Grove 
1991; Kilbourne 1995). Even when well-intentioned, these 
ecologically oriented green efforts and activities may be 
misguided. Worse, they sometimes may represent cynical 
marketing tactics such as "greenwashing"-deceptive 
claims to cover up assaults on the environment-that would 
benefit from modification or termination (cf. Stauber and 
Rampton 1995, p. 125). 
In short, "it's not easy bein' green" (e.g., Judge 1997); 
marketers and consumers face the challenge of determining 
which activities are truly green enough to serve the long- 
term best interests of the environment and its inhabitants. 
But resolving these problems requires fresh thinking (cf. 
Daly 1996; Hart 1997; Kilbourne, McDonagh, and Prothero 
1997; Nill and Shultz 1997; Shabecoff 1993; Thompson 
1987). Toward this end, one important set of issues concerns 
the extent to which business activities, marketing plans, and 
consumer products are commons-friendly, that is, the extent 
to which they work toward sustaining commonly shared nat- 
ural resources. 
More than 30 years ago, in "The Tragedy of the Com- 
mons," Garrett Hardin (1968) argued that the world's most 
compelling problem was selfish exploitation of the planet's 
scarce resources. Hardin's arguments inspired a generation 
of social scientists to examine various forms of commons 
dilemmas. Although the empirical findings from many of 
these studies were enlightening, they did not succeed in halt- 
ing-much less reversing-the assault on our common 
resources, which continues at an accelerating pace. We sub- 
mit that, in the interest of human survival, marketers must 
take a more proactive role in the management of shared 
resources by involving multiple stakeholders in their deci- 
sion making and seeking competitive advantages through 
legitimate green marketing, that is, through commons- 
friendly marketing. Accordingly, in this article, we examine 
the commons dilemma as a topic of interest to marketing 
strategists, policymakers or analysts, and consumers. 
Specifically, we discuss the logic behind the commons 
dilemma, we review relevant perspectives from other disci- 
plines, we propose a synthesis for analysis and action, and 
we propose potential roles for marketing in the resolution of 
such conflicts. In this, we hope to inspire further research 
and encourage professional efforts toward the creation of 
marketing solutions to the commons dilemma. 
The Commons Dilemma, Revisited 
In general, the "commons dilemma" refers to a phenomenon 
in which the members of a social group face choices in 
which selfish, individualistic, or uncooperative decisions, 
though seeming more rational by virtue of short-term bene- 
fits to separate players, produce undesirable long-term con- 
sequences for the group as a whole. The problem has baffled 
humanity for centuries (cf. Aristotle [340- BC] 1976; Lloyd 
1833); obvious current examples include the overconsump- 
tion of water in arid climates, the unwise harvesting of trees 
to meet the demands of lumber and paper markets, or the 
noise- and pollution-causing use of cars. Here and else- 
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where, individuals in most societies achieve short-term 
gains from consuming as much, polluting as extensively, 
and having as many children as possible; but societies, over 
time, suffer as a result (Dawes 1976). Furthermore and iron- 
ically, many of these problems have arisen because of eco- 
nomic progress, that is, because the checks that prevailed 
until the last 200 years or so have been destroyed by the bit- 
tersweet fruits of modern technology in general and by 
gains in industrial production or medical care in particular 
(Dawes 1980). In this context, an individualistic pursuit 
imperils not only our common base of resources, but also 
our very existence (Hardin 1968). Notice that this 
intractable commons dilemma reflects the combination of 
circumstances that Rangan, Karim, and Sandberg (1996, p. 
51) deem most "disadvantageous" and most likely to make 
the finding of marketing-based solutions "difficult." Thus, 
though plenty of adjacent social issues also merit consider- 
ation, we confine our attention to this most problematic 
facet of social marketing. 
A Synthesis of Social Science and 
Marketing Implications 
Building on the literature in the social sciences and market- 
ing, let us propose a synthesis for analysis of commons- 
related problems as a guide to action encouraging their res- 
olution. We first review the background of attention to the 
commons problem in the social sciences and marketing. We 
next provide a synthesis of commons-related issues and 
indicate a set of themes to suggest one or more marketing- 
oriented strategies for resolution. Each issue and strategy 
then receives more detailed discussion in developing our 
understanding of the various themes in the synthesis. 
Background in the Social Sciences: Externalities 
and Social Traps 
Economists have shown a keen interest in common property 
and resource management (cf. Coase 1960; Galbraith 1973; 
Olson 1965; Sagoff 1988). Their work has assessed the 
commons dilemma as involving externalities in the eco- 
nomic relations between people or time periods (e.g., Das- 
gupta 1982), often with the conclusion that common 
resources are managed best through variances in prices (to 
reflect the "true" costs of product usage) and/or by regula- 
tory controls (such as taxation and/or usage laws). Mean- 
while, behavioral scientists (cf. Dawes 1980; Edney 1980; 
Messick and Brewer 1983) view the commons dilemma as a 
social trap, that is, as an arrangement of rewards and pun- 
ishments in which behavior that rewards an individual in the 
short-run implies long-run punishment for that and at least 
one other individual (Cross and Guyer 1980; Platt 1973). 
Note that Cross and Guyer (1980) and Messick and 
Brewer (1983) make distinctions among various types of 
social dilemmas. For example, in addition to social traps, 
there exist social fences and individual traps. In social 
fences, short-term aversive consequences deter people from 
performing an act that would produce long-term positive 
benefits to themselves and others. In individual traps, a sin- 
gle person pursues immediate gain, but with long-term dele- 
terious effects only for that person. The distinguishing char- 
acteristic of social dilemmas, including the commons 
dilemma, is immediate individual incentive to engage in 
behavior that eventually will be harmful to that person and 
also to others (the larger group or society) who rely on the 
shared commons; thus, both group (collective) and temporal 
(long-term) components are part-and-parcel constituents of 
the commons dilemma (Messick and Brewer 1983). In the 
context of the tragedy of the commons per se, Dawes (1980) 
suggests that N participants must decide between D (defect- 
ing) and C (cooperating), where D(m) is the payoff to a 
defector when m individuals cooperate; C(m) is the payoff 
to a cooperator when m individuals cooperate; and a social 
dilemma implies that (1) D(m) > C(m + 1) and (2) C(N) > 
D(0). In summary, the "tragedy" is that (1) the relevant 
incentives work toward the lower-payoff selfishness, yet (2) 
all individuals in society or interdependent groups receive a 
lower payoff when acting selfishly than when cooperating. 
Given the ubiquitous positive and negative components in 
each individual's socially relevant decisions, particular 
interest attaches to the factors that potentially induce sub- 
jects to decide in favor of cooperative choices amid power- 
ful incentives to choose selfish or "defecting" alternatives. 
The challenge confronting marketers is to devise and recon- 
cile strategies for managing elements of the marketing mix 
so as to influence behavior in ways that help resolve various 
commons dilemmas that have a deleterious effect on the 
environment and the various stakeholders that share it (cf. 
Andreasen 1995, p. 141). 
Background in Marketing 
Although marketing scholars have examined environmental 
issues since the early 1970s (e.g., Anderson and Cunning- 
ham 1972; Fisk 1973; Kassarjian 1971), the marketing liter- 
ature makes few explicit references to the commons 
dilemma. Partial exceptions include work by Nason (1989), 
Pieters (1991), Wiener and Doescher (1991, 1994), Wiener 
(1993), Berger and Kanetkar (1995), Rangan, Karim, and 
Sandberg (1996), and Pieters and colleagues (1998). Nason 
(1989) suggests commons implications for social marketing 
as the summation of transactions that results in effects on 
all. Pieters (1991) notes commons-related problems when 
discussing a waste-separation program; Pieters and col- 
leagues (1998, p. 215) contend that environmentally 
friendly consumer behavior is a "large-scale social 
dilemma." Wiener and Doescher (1991, 1994) extend a 
stream of research on prosocial behavior and "selling broth- 
erhood" (cf. Bloom and Novelli 1981; Ritchie and 
McDougall 1985) to posit communication and cooperation 
as potential strategies for solving social dilemmas. Rangan, 
Karim, and Sandberg (1996) address what we call commons 
problems as their fourth type of social cause and suggest 
approaches more drastic than those recommended else- 
where. Thus, these studies open what has remained a rather 
small crack in the shutters through which marketers have 
begun to view the commons dilemma. 
More generally, the broader themes of socially conscious, 
conservation-oriented, and green marketing have received 
considerable attention, as have some of the underlying fac- 
tors that might determine environmental behavior for indi- 
viduals and families (e.g., Taylor and Todd 1995, pp. 
192-93) and for companies (e.g., Drumwright 1994). The 
proposition that marketing scholars and practitioners should 
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Table 1. Synthesis of Commons Resolutions and 
Implications for Marketing Engagement 
Remedy Implications for Marketing Engagement 
Regulation Examples: cost/benefit incentives through 
privatization, taxes, fees, or prices 
Organization Examples: partnerships, alliances 
Social Example: inculcation of altruistic values 
responsibility 
Communication Examples: small-scale group discussion, 
large-scale educational campaigns; 
multistakeholder dialogue, negotiated 
outcomes, and feedback through verification 
measures over time 
actively pursue solutions to environmental problems in gen- 
eral and to the commons dilemma in particular seems espe- 
cially compelling when marketing and consumer cultures 
are castigated so frequently for encouraging reckless 
resource depletion (cf. Anderson and Challagalla 1994; Kil- 
bourne, McDonagh, and Prothero 1997). 
Reflecting such beliefs, the responsible or prosocial use 
of marketing strategy is a logical extension of the econom- 
ics and psychology literature on shared resources and social 
traps explored here. Indeed, prosocial marketing appears 
well suited to provide solutions to some aspects of the com- 
mons dilemma (cf. Andreasen 1995; Nason and White 
1981). In this connection, we believe that solutions may 
emerge in at least four ways, as represented by the proposed 
synthesis to which we now turn. 
A Synthesis of Commons Resolutions and 
Implications for Marketing Engagement 
The elements of our proposed synthesis of commons resolu- 
tions and implications for marketing engagement appear in 
Table 1. These derive from a review and distillation of the 
relevant literature. We believe they are fundamental to an 
analysis of factors related to commons-based issues and 
guides to potential marketing-oriented action. In a sense, they 
might be considered new thoughts and strategies for an old 
problem. Some solutions depend on changes at the individual 
level, whereas others arise from coordinated, organized, or 
structural changes at the group, transgroup, or collective 
level. Furthermore, some resolutions focus on how actions 
affect individual or joint selfish interests in the short run, and 
others on how they influence collective considerations based 
on social welfare in the long run. Thus, Table 1 includes four 
key components: regulation, organization, social responsibil- 
ity, and communication. Note that these distillates should be 
viewed as partially overlapping themes rather than as dis- 
tinct, mutually exclusive categories. We review each theme, 
with attention to its development in the social sciences and its 
prescriptive implications for marketing. 
Regulation 
Some solutions to commons-related dilemmas alter the pat- 
tern of self-oriented incentives that characterize social situ- 
ations (Hardin and Baden 1977). Such micro-level, self- 
oriented resolutions often hinge on regulatory measure(s) 
imposed on users of the commons by an authority figure 
interested in reducing depletion or misdirection of scarce 
resources. This idea, an essential foundation for govern- 
mental intervention, is an old one (cf. Hobbes 1651; Locke 
[1699] 1967). Similarly, Hardin (1968, p. 1243) suggests 
abandoning laissez-faire mentality and implementing 
"mutually coercive devices" to invoke cooperative choices 
by means of taxes and laws typically associated with regu- 
lation. This solution presupposes the establishment of some 
superordinate authority to address the commons dilemma 
but thereby raises a second age-old quandary: Who will 
govern those who govern the commons? 
Experimental results suggest that subjects prefer to elect 
leaders to manage resources when they believe that others 
harvest excessively (Messick et al. 1983). However, this 
tendency appears to be stronger for (say) Dutch subjects 
(Samuelson et al. 1986) than for Americans (Messick et al. 
1983), which suggests that cultures differ on the issue of 
when leadership intervention is desirable and thus helps 
explain the diversity of political systems found throughout 
the world. 
Behavioral scientists have examined the effects of chang- 
ing payoff contingencies. Not surprisingly, changing incen- 
tives to reward (punish) defection decreases (increases) 
cooperative behavior (e.g., Komorita, Sweeney, and Kravitz 
1980). Also, subjects exercise self-restraint when such 
restraint helps increase the overall size or quality of the 
resource pool (e.g., Jorgenson and Papciak 1981). 
Another solution to certain types of collective social 
dilemmas involves the conversion of community-owned 
resources into privately owned resources, the logic being 
that private-property owners will have vested interests in 
preserving their personal property (Dasgupta 1982). Exper- 
imental research suggests that when resources are held pri- 
vately, they are harvested nearly optimally if harvest man- 
agement is publicly visible (e.g. Messick and McClelland 
1983). This finding hints that information sharing or com- 
munication is integral to resource management (a theme we 
develop subsequently) and suggests that privatization alone 
should not be considered a panacea for the commons 
dilemma. 
In contrast to privatization, taxation schemes or fee 
schedules show some promise as ways to resolve commons 
dilemmas. For example, taxes have helped control toxic 
waste (cf. Tietenberg 1985). Also, usage fees can help dis- 
courage abuse of the commons by assigning costs when they 
are incurred (cf. Cairncross 1995). 
With respect to specific marketing-based resolution 
strategies, traditional manipulations of the marketing mix, in 
concert with prudent regulation, may abet commons preser- 
vation. It would be advantageous to study the effects of the 
marketing mix on defecting or cooperative consumer behav- 
ior. Many aspects of product development, distribution, and 
pricing vitally affect the commons for better or worse. These 
areas of impact open opportunities for the resolution of 
some commons dilemmas through the design of regulatory 
strategies that affect such areas as product design, packag- 
ing, and pricing decisions. 
The differential pricing of electricity during peak versus 
off-peak hours would be an obvious example. Price is a par- 
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ticularly salient variable to many consumers when they are 
making what they believe to be environmentally friendly 
purchase decisions (e.g., Antil 1984). But the overarching 
message of the price-related literature indicates that, though 
many consumers generally are willing to pay more for green 
products, they are not willing to pay much more (cf. Berger 
and Kanetkar 1995), perhaps due to the disbelief among 
many consumers that green products add any real value to 
self or environment. To overcome this disbelief, education 
on the demand side must prepare the way for acceptance of 
commons-sensitive offerings created on the supply side (cf. 
Simmons and Widmar 1990). 
Organization 
By "organization," we mean group cooperation or group 
formation and incentives to create social structures or 
change interpersonal boundaries for the benefit of the com- 
mons. Such structural changes traditionally have been the 
domain of politicians, economists, and political scientists. 
Structural changes work through mechanisms that are likely 
to affect self-oriented incentives throughout the group. For 
example, one such structural determinant involves group 
size. 
From one perspective, reducing group size often can work 
toward resolving the commons dilemma. Anecdotal evi- 
dence, lay observations, and experimental findings all sug- 
gest that incentives toward cooperation or self-constraint 
tend to increase as group size decreases (Komorita and Lap- 
worth 1982). The reasons for this phenomenon are unclear 
and seem to be varied. Perhaps payoffs change as group size 
increases (Bonacich et al. 1976); perhaps individuals coop- 
erate only when others do but perceive large groups as har- 
boring noncooperators; or perhaps individuals in larger 
groups believe that their defecting decisions are less visible 
or have less impact on group welfare (Messick 1973). 
Whatever the reason for the inverse relationship between 
cooperation and group size, a solution to ecological prob- 
lems through population reduction does not appear immi- 
nently feasible. The population pressures on our global com- 
mons are enormous and increasing rapidly, despite various 
birth-control technologies and intervention policies (cf. 
Bartlett 1994; Keyfitz 1994). 
More feasible strategies may involve approaches that 
actually increase group size but with an emphasis on the col- 
lective pursuit of self-interest. This strategy might be 
viewed as a change in the way firms and groups organize, 
the way in which they structure, cooperate, and form bound- 
aries and alliances (cf. Cairncross 1992; Milne, Iyer, and 
Gooding-Williams 1996). For example, Merck & Co. coop- 
erated with the government of Costa Rica, whereby that 
country received US$1 million and a percentage of profits 
by setting aside one-quarter of its rain forest as a reserve 
area to be used for the prudent and responsible development 
of biodiversity samples (Chichilnisky 1992). Environmen- 
talists also have teamed with retailers and furniture manu- 
facturers to form buyers' groups that demand better forest- 
management practices, including independent verification 
of those practices (Ipsen 1997). Most recently, environmen- 
talists, state and federal governments, and the Pacific Lum- 
ber Company collaborated to preserve 10,000 acres of red- 
wood forest (Christensen 1999). Some environmentalists 
might argue that optimal commons-preserving scenarios in 
each of these cases would have prohibited any access or 
exploitation of forests. We take the position that negotiation, 
compromise, and, ideally, win-win outcomes for multiple 
stakeholders are expedient; similarly, we believe that, in 
most cases, incremental rather than extreme measures of 
protection are less likely to alienate corporate stakeholders 
and consequently more likely to lead to the longer-term 
desirable outcome of better protecting the commons, which 
is the goal advocated by environmentalists. 
Although many of these organizational efforts may begin 
altruistically, none will be sustained or perhaps even con- 
sidered desirable without a self-interested favorable impact 
on the corporate bottom line. Thus, such efforts have 
entered a critical period in which greater numbers of man- 
agers will need to recognize that the bottom line must "fac- 
tor in" preservation of the commons as a precondition for 
the firm's long-run survival and, therefore, as an ingredient 
in long-term profitability (e.g., Gifford 1997). To state the 
case bluntly, net present value suffers when discounted cash 
flows lack long-term potential. In this spirit, the emergence 
of the Environmental Defense Fund and subsequent cooper- 
ative efforts between corporations and environmentalists 
hint at possible win-win scenarios between the profit 
motive and responsible commons management. 
Social Responsibility. 
Although we believe large-scale corporate involvement in 
resolutions to commons dilemmas may require profit incen- 
tives, some people may choose to respond cooperatively 
because of other-oriented concerns that altruistically place 
the collective welfare above self-interest (cf. Schwartz 
1977). Thus, Edney (1980) suggests that the crux of the 
commons dilemma is not so much an issue of selfish gain 
through rationality of choice as it is a conflict of human val- 
ues (cf. Granzin and Olsen 1991; Vining and Ebreo 1990). 
Saemann (1992, p. 190) frames the issue similarly and urges 
consumers to embrace the realities of social interdepen- 
dence, namely, Gemeinschaftsgefiihl, or a sense of social 
interest, community feeling, and humanistic identification 
that fosters "oneness in interdependence" rather than "ego- 
centric independence" from humanity. Thompson (1995) 
has argued for the need to address contextual factors that 
should influence appropriate and responsible decision mak- 
ing when confronted with dilemmas. From these perspec- 
tives, we might conclude that education can teach members 
of the commons about the nature of social dilemmas and the 
need for social responsibility in individual actions. When 
experimental treatment groups have been coached on the 
long-term consequences of their actions or instructed on the 
moral obligation of selflessness, significant increases in 
cooperative behavior have occurred (e.g., Stern 1976). Fur- 
thermore, people tend to be more socially responsible in 
their decision making when they recognize the importance 
of the collective welfare and receive feedback on the impact 
of their choices (Sweeney 1973). 
Brewer (1981) has suggested that cooperative solutions to 
collective social dilemmas may be facilitated by exploring 
the constructive incentives that arise from social identity. 
The sense of membership in a common group probably 
enhances the individual's willingness to exercise personal 
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restraint in the interest of collective welfare (Messick and 
Brewer 1983). Conformity pressures seem to be higher in 
more cohesive groups, and members of an "in-group" tend 
to perceive other members more favorably, particularly in 
terms of trustworthiness, honesty, and cooperativeness, 
while perceiving themselves as part of some common fate 
(Rabbie and Horwitz 1969). 
But, despite the potentially powerful effects of social 
responsibility on individual decision making, in the context 
of environmental marketing issues, these effects may be 
unpredictable and are affected by many factors and forces 
(e.g., Olander and Thogersen 1995). For example, loyalties 
to groups and their social norms may shift (Messick and 
Brewer 1983); altruism with regard to commons-friendly 
behavior may be situation-specific (e.g., Hopper and 
Nielsen 1991) or simply secondary to internalized personal 
norms (Thogersen 1995). At bottom, as discussed previ- 
ously, attempts to solve social dilemmas may require insti- 
tutional or structural changes that support such efforts at the 
group level. 
In drawing on potential marketing-related resolutions, 
such change could not occur without technological progress 
(discussed subsequently) and profit incentives working 
together. But more fundamentally, it cannot occur unless 
consumers care increasingly, because of revisions in their 
consumption-related needs and wants, and unless people 
believe that their commons-friendly behavior will have an 
impact (cf. Berger and Corbin 1992; Kinnear, Taylor, and 
Ahmed 1974). To the benefit of the commons and ultimately 
the human condition, there now exist segments of con- 
sumers that refuse to buy furniture made from rain-forest 
wood, cosmetics tested on animals, or food served in styrene 
containers (e.g., Schwepker and Cornwell 1991; Wescott 
1992). For some customer segments, offering commons- 
friendly products or emphasizing this theme in a marketing 
communication strategy has become a potential source of 
competitive advantage or a viably unique selling proposition 
(cf. Gross 1990), as was the case with the forest-preserva- 
tion campaign by the World Wildlife Fund. 
But, as indicated previously, applications of green orien- 
tations to consumption, marketing, and protection of the 
commonly shared environment raise a host of issues await- 
ing resolution. Since the formal organization of green polit- 
ical movements in the Netherlands and Germany during the 
mid-1970s, the term "green" has acquired so many mean- 
ings as to relinquish any claims to clarity (cf. Eckersley 
1992). This confusion-coupled with cynical abuses by 
some marketers and ensuing consumer skepticism-has 
sparked efforts by governments and the private sector to 
establish generally accepted standards for green claims (cf. 
Gray-Lee, Scammon, and Mayer 1994). The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) (Code of Federal Regulations 1994, p. 
111) moved to curtail abuses of "environmental marketing 
claims." These FTC guidelines address the prominence and 
clarity of qualifications and disclosures; distinctions 
between product benefits and packaging; and the veracity of 
environmental marketing claims regarding, for example, 
general environmental benefits, degradability, com- 
postablility, recyclability, waste reduction, refillability, and 
ozone friendliness. Simon (1992) argues persuasively that 
no product should be considered green unless it meets the 
following criteria: reduced raw material content, high recy- 
cled content (e.g., aluminum cans); nonpolluting manufac- 
ture with nontoxic materials (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons, de- 
inking solvents); no unnecessary animal testing (e.g., 
cosmetics); no unfavorable impact on protected species 
(e.g., dolphin-safe tuna); low energy consumption during 
production, use, and disposal (e.g., efficient light bulbs); 
minimal packaging (e.g., fast foods); reuse/refill of pack- 
ages when possible (e.g., beverage or detergent containers); 
long, useful life with updating capacity (e.g., office 
machines); postconsumption collection/disassembly sys- 
tems (e.g., automobiles); and remanufacturing capability 
(e.g., closed- or partial-loop reuse as in composting or non- 
toxic incineration) (cf. Samli 1998). 
More succinctly, Ottman (1993, p. 49) defines green 
products as "typically durable, non-toxic, made from recy- 
cled materials and minimally packaged" but, perhaps more 
important, also asserts that green is "a relative term describ- 
ing those products with less impact on the environment than 
alternatives." Ottman further states that regional conditions, 
technological changes, attitude shifts, and regulatory 
changes all determine what consumers deem green products 
and behavior. This relativistic orientation raises an impor- 
tant question: Is a product that assaults the environment 
green simply because it replaces a product that was an even 
more egregious threat? 
Such difficulties in determining green-ness are under- 
scored by three examples. First, sales of Mobil's Hefty 
garbage bags soared when first introduced because con- 
sumers believed that they decomposed over time; when it 
later turned out that they only partially decomposed and thus 
potentially did more harm than good, sales plummeted. Sec- 
ond and more symptomatically, McDonald's decided to 
eliminate styrene packaging because customers disapproved 
of this material, even though styrene is actually more recy- 
clable than the paper that replaced it (Kleiner 1991). Third 
and even more insidiously, the consumption of products 
generally accepted as green may help the environment less 
than easily available greener alternatives, such as when 
paper towels made of recycled paper replace the option of 
using a sponge (Ottman 1993, p. 54). 
In short, truly green marketing decisions must address a 
broad and complex variety of externalities and interactive 
systems that are associated with relevant assaults on the 
commonly shared environment (cf. Meade and Nason 1991; 
Mundt 1993; Sinclair-Desgagn6 and Gabel 1997). That is, 
the effect of altruism and commons-friendly behavior is as 
much a function of systemic interdependence as of social 
interdependence. Consider the simple act of choosing 
whether to drink a cup of coffee from a styrene, paper, or 
porcelain cup. Conventional green reasoning might recom- 
mend the porcelain cup. However, consumers also should 
consider the amount of energy used by dishwashers and the 
pollution caused by detergents. Quite possibly, if frequently 
washed, the porcelain cup may consume more energy, pol- 
lute more water, and generally damage the environment 
more extensively than would either styrene or paper (The 
Economist 1992). Similarly, a pressing concern is the pro- 
clivity to focus on what we would call micro-green activities 
instead of on macro-green or systemically commons- 
friendly activities. Revisiting McDonald's as an illustration, 
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the production of beef protein (a staple of the McDonald's 
menu) is intrinsically more damaging to the commonly 
shared resources of soil and fresh water than is the produc- 
tion of soy protein. To draw attention only to styrene versus 
paper, rather than beef versus soy protein, may placate many 
or most green-conscious consumers but not make significant 
contributions toward preserving the commons (cf. Stauber 
and Rampton 1995). Thus, it is incorrect to claim that any 
organization is unilaterally green, for all its actions, with 
respect to all commonly shared resources, all the time. In 
other words, we submit that we could find the "greenest" 
company on Earth, but that, upon scrutiny, we would find 
nongreen or commons-unfriendly activity in that company. 
Therefore green-ness or commons friendliness is indeed a 
relative term and must be measured on several continua and 
with regard to each commons on which it has a direct or 
indirect bearing. 
Communication 
Communication within a group increases the probability 
that individuals will sacrifice their self-interest in favor of 
other-oriented resource conservation at the collective level 
(e.g., Hackett, Schlager, and Walker 1994). When groups 
have the opportunity to discuss a dilemma in advance, indi- 
viduals in those groups make significantly fewer defecting 
choices than individuals who have engaged in no prior dis- 
cussion (Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977). However, 
using a resource dilemma design that provided actual feed- 
back about the behavior of others, Messick and colleagues 
(1983) find that such feedback can have potentially conflict- 
ing effects on individual choices. Learning that other group 
members are restraining their harvest introduces normative 
pressures to conform by behaving cooperatively; however, it 
also may relieve some pressure toward cooperation if one 
person's choice appears less essential to the collective wel- 
fare. Furthermore, when given information that other group 
members are making selfish, defecting choices, individuals 
tend to conform in favor of their self-interest. Thus, subjects 
given false feedback that other group members were overus- 
ing the resource pool tended to increase their own harvests 
across trials, whereas subjects given false feedback that oth- 
ers were underusing the pool tended to maintain moderate 
harvests across trials. Along similar lines, Dawes, 
McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) find a positive correlation 
between individuals' perceptions of how many group mem- 
bers would cooperate and their own degrees of cooperation. 
Subjects who predicted that a larger (smaller) number of the 
other group members would cooperate tended to cooperate 
more (less) themselves. In addition, subjects who communi- 
cated about the dilemma predicted more cooperation than 
did subjects in groups that did not communicate. 
Through implicit reciprocity, a decision to make a cooper- 
ative choice often rests on the trust that others also will make 
cooperative decisions. Even if people are aware of the value 
of cooperative decisions, they are unlikely to make them if 
others fail to reciprocate (cf. Bingham 1996). In the com- 
mons, unilateral exercise of personal restraint in the interest 
of collective welfare appears futile unless one member trusts 
that others will behave similarly. In short, no one wants to 
play the sucker by cooperating while others selfishly profit at 
the group's expense (cf. Wiener and Doescher 1991). 
Research on the relationship between trust and coopera- 
tion in social dilemmas assumes that personal trust is a func- 
tion of communication through interpersonal interactions 
that reveal or disclose the motives and intentions of others 
(e.g., Kelley and Stahelski 1970). However, the commons 
situation may require individuals to make decisions without 
explicit knowledge of others. In such circumstances, choos- 
ing cooperatively requires "depersonalized trust," that is, 
trust formed in the absence of prior interaction with interde- 
pendent others (Brewer 1981). Such depersonalized trust 
thrives best in relatively homogeneous social groups or in 
cultures whose members share common values, attitudes, 
and goals. 
Depersonalized trust also can be enhanced by confidence 
that those who fail to cooperate will be sanctioned in some 
fashion. In such cases, we differentiate sanctions that are 
agreed on and administered by the group from sanctions 
administered by relatively external, regulatory bodies such 
as governments. More specifically, when groups are 
empowered to punish defectors, cooperative choices signif- 
icantly increase (Caldwell 1976). Furthermore, group norms 
can serve a similar function by providing a set of expecta- 
tions while implying that violations of these norms will be 
punished. Thus, Bonacich (1976) finds that communication 
among group members tends to focus on the normative 
requirement of cooperative choices and on expressions of 
how angry the group would be toward a defector. In these 
conditions, even in the face of high monetary incentives to 
defect, the rate of cooperative responding exceeded 90%. 
The effects just noted appear to be reinforced when deci- 
sions are personally identifiable, that is, traceable. Individu- 
als who must reveal their choice under the eye of public 
scrutiny increase their rate of cooperative behavior (Jorgen- 
son and Papciak 1981). This tendency apparently holds for 
corporations as well. Some companies exposed as polluters 
have found the adverse public relations too costly to bear 
and have begun to refrain from commons-hostile activities 
(Thomas 1992; Upah and Wokutch 1985). 
All this suggests a potentially positive role for communi- 
cation among group members in fostering cooperation 
toward resolving commons dilemmas. However, as Messick 
and Brewer (1983) point out, the practical applications of 
these findings are limited because, in real-world dilemmas, 
the direct communication among group members found in 
experimental settings is not always possible. Most social 
dilemmas, particularly the commons dilemma, involve large 
collectivities that extend far too widely to permit the sort of 
contacts that facilitate cooperation in laboratory experi- 
ments. In such conditions, relatively large and often diffuse 
groups may find little or no opportunity to communicate to 
negotiate solutions. However, Nill and Shultz (1997) con- 
tend that the issue is not so much opportunity as will; even 
among large, disparate, and culturally diverse groups with 
seemingly adversarial interests, when all stakeholders enter 
a dialogue to resolve the likes of commons dilemmas, multi- 
win and more commons-friendly marketing activities are 
more probable. 
That said, verification of agreements and ensuing market- 
ing activities that emanate from communicative interactions 
among all stakeholders become integral to the process. It is 
not enough simply that all agree to cooperate and preserve. 
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Instead, a step-series of agreed-on, incremental, and mea- 
surable results at specific periods, while the process is mov- 
ing toward the final, ideal outcome, must be verified. This 
multistep verification schema has proven to be particularly 
important to ameliorate some of the most intractable crises 
and conflicts of the past 50 years (cf. Deutsch 1973, 1985; 
Osgood 1962, 1966; Pruitt and Rubin 1986). We believe it 
is also important to any large-scale commons-friendly mar- 
keting activity, especially when stakeholders occupy adver- 
sarial positions. 
Contrary to some scholars who believe there is no techni- 
cal solution to largest-scale commons dilemmas (e.g., 
Hardin 1968; Postman 1993; Wade 1974; Winner 1986), we 
believe that technology will play a significant role-not 
because of potential breakthroughs to replace air, water, 
soil, or other commonly shared resources, but rather because 
technological advances will facilitate dissemination of 
information, enhancement of communication, education of 
all stakeholders, and verification (cf. Christensen 1999; Sae- 
mann 1992). Hardin (1968, p. 1245) notes that "one does not 
know whether a man killing an elephant or setting fire to 
grassland is harming others until one knows the total system 
in which his act appears." Thus, communication will enable 
each of us to understand the systemic repercussions of 
defecting behavior. And, as the advent of the information 
superhighway has made clear, technology eventually will 
enable communication networks to reach us all. In essence, 
as we move into the Age of Global Information, the discon- 
nected and disparate world collectives that Messick and 
Brewer (1983) argue would preclude effective communica- 
tion, thereby blocking dilemma resolution, will eventually 
grow less disparate and more connected. Hardin (1998) 
recently has shifted his position on the role of technology 
and the extent to which it may abet commons preservation. 
Similarly to us, Hardin now believes that technological 
advancements may facilitate information dissemination and 
group cooperation, as well as the development of more com- 
mons-friendly products and marketing processes. 
Consider, for example, the potential role(s) of computer 
networks and simulations, television networks, satellite pho- 
tos of the rain forest, and other telecommunication tech- 
nologies. Each informs and thereby empowers consumer- 
interest groups that, in turn, can use communication 
networks to advocate commons-friendly agendas, monitor 
program compliance, publicize conspicuous abuses, pres- 
sure regulators, and motivate marketers. Consumer empow- 
erment and its attendant perceptions of consumer effective- 
ness are vital to progress in addressing commons-related 
environment issues (cf. Kinnear, Taylor, and Ahmed 1974). 
Much of the previously cited psychology literature clearly 
indicates that focused efforts and increased self-efficacy 
enhance commons-friendly activities (Kaufman and Kerr 
1993), and recent field studies concur (Bromley 1992). 
Studies on consumers per se indicate similar conclusions 
(Ellen, Wiener, and Cobb-Walgren 1991). 
Although Hardin (1968, p. 1244) states that progress is 
impossible until we "explicitly exorcise the spirit of Adam 
Smith," we may have entered an era in which Smith's invis- 
ible hand will play a role in the form of communication 
technology guided by marketing acumen. Therefore, the 
commons preservation message slowly is permeating the 
marketplace. Despite Hardin's (1968, p. 1245) argument 
that "the morality of an act cannot be determined by a pho- 
tograph," photographs-and their evolutionary analogs in 
the form of digital reproductions, computer images, video 
screens, and so forth-become an important link in the com- 
munications network when their interpretation, contextual- 
ization, and dissemination facilitate change. 
Consequently, marketing communications that inform 
consumers about the value of commons conservation and 
the pitfalls of commons degradation seem a potential cata- 
lyst for prosocial consumption and movement toward reso- 
lution of the commons dilemma (cf. Lord 1994). Such 
strategic applications of marketing communication have 
been referred to as "attacking the barriers to cooperation" 
(Wiener and Doescher 1991). Communicating the value of 
commons-friendly (cooperative) consumption and the costs 
of commons-unfriendly (defecting) consumption is also 
more likely to inspire design and production of commons- 
friendly products and render them less price sensitive. 
Again, this assertion is a reasonable extension of previously 
cited experimental findings (e.g., Bonacich 1976). 
As a final example, we return to the case of cooperation 
among various stakeholders with common interests in red- 
wood forests (Christensen 1999). This cooperative agree- 
ment, the habitat conservation plan, embodies much of our 
synthesis and may prove an instructive model for a type of 
new thinking that we encouraged in our introductory 
remarks. Briefly, multiple stakeholders, some with adver- 
sarial perspectives and contentious positions, enter a con- 
structive dialogue. This communicative process leads to an 
alliance of sorts and a negotiated agreement with specific 
and measurable outcomes over time. The need for a sys- 
temic plan for action and commons management effectively 
is communicated and recognized by consumers, activists, 
regulators, marketers, and other stakeholders in ways 
designed to influence usage and consumption decisions that, 
at this juncture, would appear to be commons friendly, at 
least with regard to this particular commons of focus 
(10,000 acres of redwood forest). 
In Figure 1, we delineate the essence of the extant agree- 
ment: (1) presence of redwood commons, (2) stakeholders 
in that commons, and (3) a negotiated agreement on how to 
manage it. We also suggest more expansive elements for 
integrative commons management. Our expansion includes 
a monitoring or verification program to alert stakeholders to 
the unfolding processes that result from the agreement. 
More specifically, the engaged stakeholders, as well as 
external policy analysts, will and should monitor the pre- 
scribed activities to determine whether those activities abet 
redwood commons preservation, consistent with the incre- 
mental measures and agreed on time lines, to the satisfaction 
of the vested parties to the negotiated conservation plan. 
Moreover, the model requires a broader, integrative sys- 
temic approach that will determine the extent to which the 
agreement affects other commons beyond the specific 
acreage directly included, such as air, watersheds, soil, or 
fisheries that may be affected by harvesting, downstream 
production, distribution, and product usage or consumption. 
Finally, note that in the stakeholder negotiation and compli- 
ance model for commons management, the participating 
parties must literally look "outside the box" (i.e., the cen- 
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Figure 1. Stakeholder Negotiation and Compliance Model for Commons Management 
Impact on Other Commons 
(e.g., air, watersheds, oil) 
Stakeholders 
Regulators, 
Activists, 
Consumers, 
Lumber 
company 
Redwood 
Commons 
Negotiated Agreement for 
Commons Management 
Monitoring/ 
Verification 
trally located set of principal stakeholders) to resolve their 
commons dilemma. 
Discussion and Directions for Further 
Research 
Irrespective of the transnational cooperative efforts to 
address commons-related issues (e.g., the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development and 
the ongoing "Rio Process" [Jordan and Voisey 1998]), pro- 
tracted environmental degradation resulting from commons 
dilemmas indicates that fresh thinking truly is warranted. 
With the increasing global influence of the marketing con- 
cept, responsible and responsive activity by marketers and 
effective application of marketing tools may provide one 
avenue of assistance in the search for resolutions to difficul- 
ties stemming from the tragedy of the commons. Toward that 
end, we have proposed the synthesis of commons resolutions 
and implications for marketing engagement (Table 1) and the 
stakeholder negotiation and compliance model for commons 
management (Figure 1). We hope that both the synthesis and 
the model will inspire further research. In that spirit, we pro- 
pose the following topics for empirical investigation: 
1. Consumers' commons-related choice processes and factors 
that influence those processes, including factors that enhance 
consumer motivations to engage in green consumption and 
willingness to endure such short-term costs as higher product 
prices or inconvenient purchase venues; 
2. The source, nature, and persuasiveness of attempts at social 
influence leading in the direction of altruistic values; 
3 The marketing communications mix (e.g., advertising, promo- 
tions, selling, public relations, sponsorship, labeling) appro- 
priate for encouraging changes in commons-related attitudes 
and behavior (e.g., purchases, selfish exploitation); and 
4. Perhaps most important, systemic factors and integrative 
forces relevant o administering the interactive effects of mar- 
keting activity, governing bodies, regulatory guidelines, 
enforcement programs, consumption, and their interrelated 
impacts on the commons and its multiple stakeholders, in 
short, a systemic approach that should be integral to the 
analysis and solution for some of the most fractious global 
macrochallenges (e.g., integrative management of multiple 
commons). 
More specifically, we believe that the following proposi- 
tions are particularly compelling, lend themselves to empir- 
ical testing, and therefore should be of interest to marketing 
policy scholars: 
P1: Communication targeted at increasing the likelihood of 
commons-friendly behavior tends especially to succeed 
when that communication reaches all stakeholders, includes 
information about others, invokes a sense of trust in others, 
and enunciates measurable steps toward mutually agreed-on 
outcomes. 
P2: Communicating the value of commons-friendly behavior 
and the costs of commons-unfriendly behavior will tend to 
inspire not only commons-friendly consumption, but also 
the production of commons-friendly products and services 
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and to render such offerings both less price sensitive and less 
cost sensitive. 
P3: Marketing activities aimed at enhancing social responsibil- 
ity, altruism, and selflessness will further the prudent man- 
agement of common resources. 
P4: Systemic commons-management strategies mutually agreed 
on by all stakeholders of that commons (regulators, activists, 
consumers, producers, and so forth) will yield more effec- 
tive commons-friendly management and more successful 
environmental protection programs. 
Ps: Mutually agreed-on strategies that more fully include spe- 
cific, measurable outcomes and address downstream com- 
mons, as well as the commons of immediate interest, will 
yield more optimal management and protection programs 
for a longer period of time, to the benefit of a larger number 
of stakeholders. 
By empirically investigating these and related proposi- 
tions, researchers with special interests in marketing com- 
munications, ethics and social responsibility, organizational 
design and strategic alliances, consumer decision making, 
management by objectives, and so forth can enjoy opportu- 
nities, not to mention challenges, to leverage their expertise. 
In conclusion, responsible and responsive prosocial activ- 
ity by marketers and effective application of marketing tools 
to public policy may provide an avenue of assistance in the 
search for resolutions to difficulties stemming from envi- 
ronmental social traps. Because marketers typically pursue 
activities that predict, transact, and assess commercial 
exchange (cf. Bagozzi 1975), they may be positioned 
uniquely to ameliorate the tragedy of the commons, in so far 
as commercial exchanges and the product usage or con- 
sumption resulting therefrom ultimately abet or assault the 
commons. Further research as well as both vision and vigi- 
lance are needed to overcome the tragic consequences 
potentially stemming from the inertia of short-sighted and 
self-interested marketers. By working with consumers, reg- 
ulators, interest groups, and researchers-particularly in the 
areas of communications and consumer decision making, 
product development, green advocacy, program design, and 
systems management-marketers might contribute to solu- 
tions in an area in which, too often, they have been vilified 
for encouraging social waste, wreaking ecological destruc- 
tion, and contributing to the tragedy of the commons. 
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